Fodor and Pylyshyn [Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis. Cognition, 28, argue that connectionist models are not able to display systematicity other than by implementing a classical symbol system. This claim entails that connectionism cannot compete with the classical approach as an alternative architectural framework for human cognition. We present a connectionist model of sentence comprehension that does not implement a symbol system yet behaves systematically. It consists in a recurrent neural network that maps sentences describing situations in a microworld, onto representations of these situations. After being trained on particular sentence-situation pairs, the model can comprehend new sentences, even if these describe new situations. We argue that this systematicity arises robustly and in a psychologically plausible manner because it depends on structure inherent in the world.
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Introduction
Human language is systematic to a considerable degree, which is to say that ''the ability to produce/understand some sentences is intrinsically connected to the ability to produce/understand certain others" (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988, p. 37) . For example, somebody who can understand the sentences Charlie plays chess inside and Charlie plays hide-and-seek outside, will also be able to understand Charlie plays chess outside and Charlie plays hide-and-seek inside.
Ever since Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) argued that neural networks cannot display systematicity, except by implementing a classical symbol system, this issue has been fiercely debated. This debate is of considerable importance to cognitive science, for if it is indeed true that neural networks offer no explanation for the systematicity observed in language and thought, some would argue that connectionism has little (if any) value as a representational theory.
In this paper, our first objective is to present a connectionist model of sentence comprehension that does not implement a symbol system. Second, we investigate the model's ability to behave systematically, and compare this to different claims about systematicity in human sentence comprehension. Third, we set out to show that the model comes to display systematicity by capitalizing on structure present in the world, in language, and in the mapping from language to events in the world. Our connectionist explanation of systematic language comprehension takes into account that the structure of the world is reflected in the training input to which neural networks adapt. During training, external structures become internalized and, therefore, systematicity does not need to be inherent to the system. It is conceivable that this holds not only for neural networks, but also for the human cognitive system.
Semantic systematicity
To investigate connectionist systematicity, we need an operationalization that allows for the quantification of the systematic abilities of connectionist models. Hadley (1994a) operationalized systematicity by putting it in terms of learning and generalization. A neural network generalizes if it can successfully process inputs it was not 0010-0277/$ -see front matter Ó 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.11.013
